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Summary 
This paper draws on data obtained from a questionnaire survey conducted for the 242 private R&D 
projects  supported  by  NEDO  (New  Energy  and  Industrial  Technology  Development  Organization), 
Japan’s public management organization promoting R&D, to explore how dependence on government 
support affects processes of private R&D projects and, in turn, the performance and commercialization of 
developed technologies.   
Our analyses show that projects receiving more than a half of their entire R&D expenditures from 
NEDO tend to be isolated from in-house departments.    Such isolation, derived mainly from the projects’ 
unique positions in “double dependence” structures, negatively affects project performance, especially 
those related to commercialization, in two ways. 
First, high dependence on government resources prevents project members from interacting with 
people  outside  the  project  within  the  company.    This  inhibits  project  members  from  effectively 
leveraging internal resources - both technological and human - to overcome technological problems.   
Secondly, such high dependence weakens internal controls over project activities.    This causes delayed 
development of marketable technologies and makes it difficult for projects to achieve justification for 
further investment required for commercialization. 
Our findings suggest that for successful R&D leading to commercialization, both companies and 







1． Performance of Government Funding for R&D activities in Private Sectors 
Although government support for private R&D has exhibited a downward trend in countries around 
the world in recent years, including a reduction in the US military budget, for example, such support 
remains at a scale that cannot be ignored. In Japan, for example, nearly 20% of the 19 trillion yen in R&D 
expenditures by the private sector was supported with government funding in 2008 [1]. 
For many countries, innovation that will create economic values has become a vital issue as the 
maturation  of  various  industries  accelerates  in  tandem  with  increasingly  severe  global  competition.   
Given such circumstances, in recent years there has been no lack of instances in which government 
funding has flowed not only into basic research, but into applied research and product development that 
will lead to commercialization as well.   
In the United States the Bayh-Dole Act, which was enacted in 1980 and enables firms to retain 
ownership of the results from government funded R&D, is said to have accelerated R&D undertaken by 
private firms with government support and commercialization of the R&D results. In response to this 
change,  the  so-called  “Japanese-version  Bayh-Dole  Act”  (Act  on  Special  Measures  for  Industrial 
Revitalization, Article 30) was enacted in Japan as well in 1989, making it easier for firms to receive 
government support for the development of technology that differentiates their products in the market. 
On the other hand, as the fiscal condition in each country is tight, the use of public funds is being 
subjected to sharp public scrutiny. The merits of such uses are especially easy to question when public 
funds are lavished on R&D in a way that encourages commercialization at specific firms. 
Under such conditions, it is no longer possible to steer around questions asking “Does government 
funding really promote private R&D activities?” and “Why should we be spending our tax money on 




Among existing research there are many studies that have attempted to quantitatively clarify the effects 
of government funding at the industry and national levels [2], [3], [4]. On the other hand, there is little 
research from a micro-economic viewpoint that looks specifically at which processes are followed by 
projects that receive government funding to produce results. To use public funds effectively, however, it is 
necessary to understand not only the results at the macro level, but to also supplement such understanding 
with an analysis of the specific processes by which projects that receive government funding achieve their 
results. 
Particularly when government support extends even to applied research and product development, and 
the results from development belong to a specific firm, determining whether firms are able to create new 
businesses from R&D and create economic values becomes an important factor for measuring the effects 
of government funding. From this perspective as well, research on the project level management is 
needed. 
Investigating the project management of  government-funded R&D also raises several theoretical 
questions since it is distinct from those of ordinal private sector R&D projects. 
Government funding is significant in promoting R&D that, despite its importance, tends to suffer from 
underinvestment if left to the private sector [5], [6]. By liberating R&D activity from the severe and 
short-term profit pressures at profit-seeking enterprises, government funding has an effect of promoting 
R&D with a long-term view. 
For that very reason, however, the commercialization incentives could be inhibited for R&D projects 
that are isolated from the selection process within private firms. With public institutions that support R&D 
as well, some doubt remains - despite project evaluations being conducted by teams of experts - as to 




commercialization. Moreover, projects might be isolated organizationally or professionally from other 
departments, and the ability to exchange information within the firm obstructed, as a result of receiving 
government funding. There is also a possibility the use of human and technical resources within a 
company will be restricted due to such isolation. Differing from typical R&D projects at private firms, 
government funded R&D projects need to consider these additional issues for successful development and 
commercialization.   
Based on such an awareness of the problem, this paper seeks to empirically identify the factors that 
determine a success or a failure of commercializing private sector R&D activities that receive government 
funding, by analyzing data obtained from a follow-up questionnaire survey concerning projects supported 
by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) (“NEDO projects”) in 
Japan. NEDO, under the direction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), provides 
support for private sector R&D activity with a particular emphasis on economic results. The authors 
believe this will provide a suitable exploratory environment for measuring the effect of government 
funding from the point of whether commercialization is or is not pursued. 
 
2． Existing Research 
Much of the existing research has focused on the increase or decrease of R&D investment at private 
sectors after the receipt of public funds in order to identify the effects of public supports [7], [8], [9], [10], 
[11], [12], [13]. In this approach, if R&D expenditures in private sectors were reduced by the injection of 
government funding, public funds would be judged to be merely an alternative to private sector capital 
and to have no additional effect. If the private sector was found to boost its R&D outlays, on the other 




To  begin  with,  however,  there  are  problems  with  the  idea  itself  of  understanding  the  effect  of 
government funding from the increase or decrease in private sector R&D spending [14]. For example, 
during an economic downturn, a firm that is experiencing a business slump and seen its spending capacity 
wither might have no alternative but to abandon some ongoing R&D projects even if the long-term 
importance of the projects is high. When government supports R&D activity that can no longer be carried 
out because of a business slump, even if such government funding is mere “substitution” and is available 
only temporarily, this is an effective alternative for encouraging private R&D activity. 
Conversely, there might also be some instances where a private firm looks to government funding 
simply  to  play  technological  catch-up  with  competitors,  even  though  it  has  no  strong  intention  of 
commercializing its R&D results. In other cases, public funds might be allocated to projects that have not 
been approved internally because of researchers’ specific interests. In such instances, it is difficult to say 
the public funds were used effectively even if private firms’ R&D expenditures were maintained or 
increased. This is all the more true if patents developed through a government funded project belong to a 
specific firm but are merely hoarded and are not commercialized. 
Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain,  especially  when  providing  government  funding  for  R&D 
activities aimed at commercialization, whether such funding is in fact linked to commercialization and 
creating economic value. To do so, we must lower a unit of analysis to the individual project level and 
investigate the details of the R&D management. 
With this respect, some existing studies have looked at the relationship between government funding 
and performance of R&D projects at private firms [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. These studies tend to 
analyze the correlation between the government funding and R&D performance by taking the presence or 




or received as a dependent variable
1. These studies report that, on average, the acceptance of public 
funding has a positive influence on performance, although it is conditional.  
Unfortunately these researches are in some respects inadequate for grasping the effects  of government  
R&D support. First, the number of  patents obtained cannot directly capture the contribution to 
commercialization. Even if a patent is obtained, the government funding cannot necessarily be said to 
have had an effect from the standpoint of creating economic value if the patent cannot be com mercialized 
and is held idly inside the firm. Secondly, whereas the existing researches identify the relationship 
between the amount of government funding and the results, they do not fully clarify the causal 
mechanisms that produce the results.  
In such contexts, this study looks at government funded projects with the goal of empirically clarifying 
the mechanisms that produce commercialization results, while noting the unique management issues 
pertaining to government funded projects.  
 
3． Issues on Government Funded Project: Deriving Hypotheses 
3.1  The problem of dual dependency 
Government funding for private R&D activities is broadly divided between direct support and indirect 
support. The latter – indirect support – refers to tax exemption for R&D investments. The former – direct 
support – is further divided into “contracts” and “assistance.” A “contract” is a provision of funds to 
procure the products and services government agencies use. “Assistance,” on the other hand, is the 
                                                   
1  Reference [15] examines the results of product development by looking not only at the technology but also encompassing 
economic indicators. Moreover, in [16], Cockburn and Henderson indirectly demonstrated the relationship between research 
results and the presence or absence of public funding or its amount, and also briefly discussed the mechanism leading to this result. 
They showed that R&D activities performed by private sector firms in cooperation with public institutions has an effect on the 
R&D resource allocation process and on the incentives to conduct science-level research and pure research, and that as a result it 
also has a positive influence on the R&D results, as shown by the number of important patents. Finally, they assumed this joint 




provision  of  funds  for  the  R&D  activities  of  private  sector  firms,  primarily  in  the  form  of  grants 
(subsidies).   
The present study looks at “assistance,” and when government funding is discussed in the following 
sections it refers to “assistance” in this sense
2. Moreover, although government funding ranges from 
providing support for basic research for the purpose of broadly disseminating scientific knowledge to 
providing support for R&D activities as an economic policy aimed at immediate commercialization, the 
present study particularly concerns support of R&D activities for commercialization purposes. 
Such government funded projects aimed at commercialization have a characteristic different from 
ordinal corporate R&D activity in that the R&D is placed under the dual control of both the support entity 
(public institution) and the receiving entity (private corporation). Because government funded projects 
depend on public funds, various obligations, including reporting on asset management, cost allocations 
and financial results, are imposed along with the requirement to evaluate the progress of the R&D activity. 
The actual R&D activity, on the other hand, is placed under the management of private firms. Moreover, 
despite being dependent on public funds and subject to progress management during the R&D phase, 
investments are made on the basis of the firm’s independent decision-making at the commercialization 
stage. 
Because of this dual nature, government funded projects can be thought to present the following two 
issues related to the promotion of development for commercialization. One is the issue of “disruption of 
                                                   
2  In the case of Japan, the “commissioned research” system exists as an intermediate position between “contract” and “assistance.” 
Under this system, private sector entities conduct R&D on themes determined by government agencies, with the agencies picking 
up the tab and the R&D results reverting to the agencies (central government). Although this system had expanded because of the 
global trend toward abolishing industrial subsidies and the goal of aiming at a more impartial diffusion of the results from 
investments of public funds, it also led to enactment of the Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act described above once it had become 
clear the system was hindering commercialization incentives at commissioned firms because all of the study results belonged to 
the government. Today much government funding continues to be implemented by government agencies through the commission 
system. Because it has been possible since 1989 for firms implementing the R&D to keep the results, however, thanks to the 
Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act, the current commissioned research system can be positioned as “assistance” that is closer to 




exchanges of information with other in-house departments.” The other is the issue of “weakened controls 
concerning commercial feasibility.” 
 
3.2  Disruption of exchanges of information with other in-house departments 
By isolating R&D activity that is considered to be socially important from the resource allocation 
process at the private firms that demands strict investment profitability, even if only for a short time, 
government funding has the effect of ensuring the continuation of development activity. Because of this 
very isolation, however, there is a possibility the exchange of information with other divisions within the 
firm will be hampered. 
Normally a condition for government funding is that equipment purchased and technical knowledge 
developed with government funds will be used for the project, and the leveraging facilities and knowledge 
to other internal activities (during the project period) is restricted. Consequently it is difficult for other 
in-house projects to benefit directly from the government funded project in question. 
Moreover, because of the obligation to publicly disclose the details of research results in the evaluation 
phase, government funded projects are likely to become an “opening” through which internal information 
leaks outside the firm. Of course, in making the results public, a company will take sufficient care to 
ensure that the information does not work to its detriment in the competitive marketplace. Developed 
technologies also can be protected as patents
3. In cases where patents will not be used effectively in the 
future, however, it is normal to establish the condition that the public institution will exercise the rights to 
the R&D results, and it is not always possible to fully ensure the avoidance of an information spillage in 
the future. Given such circumstances, there is  certainly nothing odd if other divisions within a company 
have become nervous about sharing information with a government funded project. An especially 
                                                   




cautious response to this problem is required when a government funded project will be undertaken jointly 
with another company. 
Moreover, when a government funded project is conducted using the centralized lab system, it is also 
geographically isolated from other internal R&D activities. For a government funded project under such 
conditions, compared with a typical internal R&D project there is a possibility the free exchange of 
information  or  joint  activity  with  other  internal  divisions  will  be  limited  both  organizationally  and 
psychologically. Such limits are likely to be especially prevalent when a project is supported entirely by 
public funds. This is summarized as the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher a project’s dependence on government funding, the greater the restrictions on 
the exchange of information with other internal divisions. 
 
3.3  Weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility 
Government funding is significant for supplementing R&D activities in which for-profit firms, with 
their emphasis on profitability, would not consider investing because of high uncertainty or large risk (but 
which are important for developing the national economy or improving society and citizens’ lives). For 
firms, investment profitability is enhanced and R&D project continuity is assured by the receipt of 
government funding. 
Precisely for that reason, however, there is a possibility that checks on the business profitability of 
projects that receive government funding will be weakened compared with other regular internal R&D 
projects. Of course, the public supporting institution is also likely to evaluate the status of the project’s 




reports are not encouraging. It is difficult to conceive of such an evaluation process accurately reflecting 
business profitability, however. 
Because the size of the investment necessary for actual commercialization will differ from the amount 
required in the R&D phase, a firm will make a prudent decision after considering its own strategy and 
available resources. It is impossible, however, for the support entity (or auditor chosen by the support 
entity) to fully understand the internal circumstances of the firm, such as its corporate strategy and the 
resources it possesses. Therefore in many cases an evaluation by the support entity must be based on a 
progress report that focuses on the technology development. 
Ultimately, an evaluation of the specific possibilities for commercialization must rely on the firm. 
There is a possibility, however, that government funded projects which depend only minimally on internal 
resources will not be subjected to sharp scrutiny concerning business profitability. Such projects can also 
easily float above the internal “horse trading” process through which the regular in-house developers 
struggle  for  their  annual  budget  provision.  This  discussion  can  be  recapitulated  as  the  following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher a project’s dependence on government funding, the lower the internal 
participation pertaining to commercial feasibility. 
 
3.4  Impact on Development Performance 
Both of the two hypotheses discussed above – “disruption of exchanges of information with other 
in-house departments” and “weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility” – can be thought to 




First the disruption of information exchanges with other in-house departments may have the negative 
impact on the technical problem-solving activities. In the process of problem solving, other internal R&D 
activities and past experience are exploited in no small way. Limiting access to the ample technical, 
human, and information resources that have been accumulated internally will most likely work to the 
disadvantage of progress in resolving technical problems. Conversely, a project that has achieved an 
effective use of internal resources, despite of its high dependence on government funding, can thought to 
be more likely to produce higher technological performance. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3-1: The greater the exchange of information with individuals in other internal divisions, 
the greater the technological development performance of a project. 
 
Frequent communications with other people within the company has another effect – it also increases 
the likelihood of commercialization of the project results. Unlike in the development phase, significant 
internal resources must be mobilized for commercialization. For this purpose, it is necessary not only to 
plead the significance of the technological results but also to obtain broad agreement within the company 
from various viewpoints, including the profitability of the business, the future prospects for the technology 
and the contribution to the firm’s long-term strategy [20]. Frequent communication with other internal 
divisions during the R&D phase is thought to be effective in obtaining such mutual consent. The reason is 
that helping the various internal people to understand the details and prospects of the technological 
development from an early stage can lead to acquiring legitimacy in the commercialization phase. This is 





Hypothesis 3-2: Acquiring legitimacy for commercialization of a project is  easier when there is 
frequent exchange of information with other internal divisions over the term of the project. 
 
On  the  other  hand  “weakened  controls  concerning  commercial  feasibility,”  the  second  issue 
surrounding government funded projects, is thought to first influence the problem solving activities related 
to mass production and cost issues. In order to commercialize the developed technology, it must clear the 
problems of mass production, including ease of manufacture and cost when embodied as a product. If 
controls on feasibility grow lax, however, a project can focus purely on technical breakthroughs and 
problem solving (which is likely to enhance the technological performance), but there is a possibility the 
mass production and cost problems will be relatively downplayed. Conversely, project members are likely 
to proceed with development while conscious of mass production requirements, if the internal checks for 
feasibility are performed. 
Furthermore, the continuous involvement of other internal divisions concerning feasibility is believed 
to have a positive influence on the acquisition of legitimacy for commercialization. This is because the 
checks on commercial feasibility that have been performed from the R&D phase, with the exchange of 
information regarding feasibility, are tied to obtaining internal consent concerning commercialization of 
the developed technology. The above discussion can be summarized as the following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 4-1: The greater the internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility, the greater 





Hypothesis 4−2: The greater the internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility, the easier it 
is for commercialization of a project to acquire legitimacy. 
 
Finally,  as  already  suggested  by  the  above  hypotheses,  the  three  performance  indicators, 
“technological performance,” “acquisition of legitimacy” and “resolution of cost problems,” are each 
thought to improve the feasibility of commercialization of a project’s results. This can be summarized as 
the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Technological results, acquisition of legitimacy and resolution of cost problems each 
increase the possibility of commercialization of the technology a project has developed. 
 
The analytical framework showing a synthesis of the above hypotheses is provided in Fig. 1 below. 
Beginning from the following section we will proceed with a specific data analysis along lines that follow 
this analytical framework. 
 
--Figure 1: Hypotheses and analytical framework-- 
 
4． Research Method 
4.1  Summary of survey and samples 
We will test the above hypotheses by using data from a follow-up surveys implemented by NEDO in 
June 2009 (112 responses: a response rate was 100%) and by NEDO and Hitotsubashi University jointly 




questions, are questionnaire surveys for R&D projects at private firms to which NEDO has provided 
financial assistance.    Each questionnaire was sent to a leader of the company who had taken charged of 
the project in question, which had, in some cases, involved multiple companies.    In most cases the 
leaders answered the questionnaires by themselves. We acknowledged the limitation of data obtained by 
one  person  for  each  questionnaire  though  the  leaders  were  supposed  to  have  relatively  unbiased 
information for the sample projects that had included 6.6 members on average.       
29 respondents answered both surveys, for which we excluded the 2009 responses from the analysis.   
The resulting 384 samples are divided into four categories: 83 projects that resulted in a product market 
launch (commercialization) (referred to below as “a product launch”), 159 projects that were implemented 
but terminated (referred to below as “a project termination”), and 110 projects are continuing R&D within 
own companies following NEDO supported activities. We also have 32 unavailable responses.    For the 
present study we used the total of 242 samples for either a product launch or a project termination. 
Specifically the surveys ask questions, on a project basis, on topics such as the management and 
performance of the projects, the economic environment and market conditions in which the projects were 
implemented, and the broad effects on society and the economy as a result of project activities. 
Sample characteristics are as follows. The industries that the sample project firms belong to range from 
automobiles, electronic devices, materials, and chemicals. The size of the firms is between more than 
30,000 employees on a consolidated basis to less than 100 employees, with consolidated sales extending 
from over 2.0 trillion yen to less than 100 million yen. The number of years since establishment ranges 
between three years to 120 years. Although, in principle, all the NEDO supported projects need to 
envision commercialization in the future, expectation for that differs from company to company. Firms 




accounted for 74% of the entire sample when firms that succeeded in a product launch without initial 
plans for commercialization are also included
4.   
 
4.2  Operationalization 
In the following paragraphs we discuss the regression analysis divided into three phases and the 
structural equation model integrating them in accordance with the analytical framework in Figure 1. First, 
with regard to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we performed a regression analysis of the influence the 
extent of dependency on public funds exerts on “the exchange of information with other internal divisions” 
and “internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility.” Next, for Hypothesis 3 (3-1 and 3-2) and 
Hypothesis 4 (4-1 and 4-2), and for Hypothesis 2, we analyzed the influence “the exchange of information 
with other internal divisions” and “internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility” exert on the 
three project results, namely “technological results,” “resolution of cost problems” and “acquisition of 
legitimacy.” In addition, we analyzed the influence these three results exert on “commercialization,” after 
taking other factors that affect commercialization into consideration. Finally, by analyzing a series of 
structural equation models, we verified the cause and effect paths, with product launch and project 
termination as dependent variables. 
The variables used for the analysis are described below. “Percentage of public funds” highlights the 
extent of dependency on public funds as illustrated by the ratio of funds from NEDO as a share of all 
R&D expenditures for the project. We defined dependency on NEDO for 50% or more of a project’s 
funding as “high,” which we measured as a binary (dummy) variable showing whether it corresponds to 
“high.” 
                                                   
4  As discussed below, the effect on the analysis results was not large even when analyzed after excluding the small number of 




“The exchange of information with other internal divisions” uses a variable to measure the extent of 
“communications  with  other  (internal)  divisions”  along  a  five-point  scale.  “Internal  participation 
pertaining to commercial feasibility” is a synthesis  variable (mean  value) to  measure the extent of 
implementation of both a “cost analysis by other internal divisions” and a “market analysis by other 
internal divisions,” according to a five-point scale
5. 
According to the hypotheses  described above, a development project’s results can be understood from 
the three aspects: “technological results,” “resolution of cost problems,” and “acquisition of legitimacy.” 
“Technological results” is a synthesis variable used to measure the extent to which technological issues are 
overcome and development accelerated, and “acquisition of legitimacy” is a synthesis variable used to 
measure both the extent to which development legitimacy is secured internally and increased external 
awareness, according a five-point scale (α are 0.68 and 0.75, respectively)
6. “Resolution of cost problems” 
is a variable to measure the extent to which cost issues are overcome, using a five-point scale. 
With regard to whether a project is commercialized, the sample projects were originally classified into 
“a product launch” and “a project termination”
7. 
In the specific analytical models we added several control variables. As an alternative hypothesis to 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, communications with individuals in other internal divisions can be 
anticipated to grow, and in-house participation concerning commercial feasibility expected to increase, 
when there is already a project near the commercialization phase at the outset. Therefore we added 
                                                   
5  From the standpoint of accomplishing  a project  effectively and  efficiently, participation by  individuals  from other  internal 
departments, more than by members in the project, is thought to be more effective for establishing such discipline. In addition, 
reflecting the cost trend from a profit perspective and the market trend in terms of securing customer needs in achievement of the 
project is thought to be particularly important for commercialization of the contents. Therefore in the present study we used these 
two instrumental variables as a means to illustrate the concept of “internal participation for control.” 
6  We included “increased external awareness” in constructing the “acquisition of legitimacy” variable because this reflected the 
findings in the existing researches indicating the importance that acceptance by individuals outside the company has for the 
acquisition of legitimacy within organizations [20]. 
7  For these synthesis variables we adopted the mean values for each given variable, but as discussed below the effect on the an alysis 




“number of members responsible for commercialization at the start of the project” and “basic research (a 
dummy variable to show a project is at the basic research phase at the time of start-up),” to control for 
proximity to the commercialization phase at the time of project initiation. Furthermore, because the 
exchange of information with other internal projects can be restricted in order to maintain confidentiality 
when a project is a collaborative program with another company, we introduced a dummy variable to 
show a project is a “collaborative project with another company.” 
Moreover, to eliminate the possibility it will be easy to attain results if there are simply many project 
members, for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 we introduced “number of members participating in project” 
as a control variable.   
Finally,  we  considered  the  following  variables  as  factors  affecting  commercialization.  First,  we 
recognized  changes  in  a  project’s  external  environment  through  two  questions:  “Did  the  economy 
deteriorate more than expected?” and “Did the business strategy within the organization change and the 
project diverge from the original orientation after the project had been completed?” Both are dummy 
variables to show whether the above questions apply. 
In addition, we looked at the degree to which the technology developed by the project attracted 
attention, which also indirectly indicates the competitive environment, by asking, “Has this technology 
already broadly attracted attention in society and are many firms developing the technology?” That the 
technology in question had attracted society’s attention meant that market growth could be anticipated, but 
also that appropriating profits might be difficult because the market would be competitive. Therefore it is 
possible this variable could influence commercialization positively or negatively. 
Furthermore, we measured the level of managements’ commitment to the projects with the question, 




A firm’s final decision-making regarding commercialization can be affected substantially depending on 
how important the development and the commercialization of the technology are to the firm’s long-term 
strategy.   
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables used for the analysis and a correlation matrix are shown 
in Table 1 below. 
 
--Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation table-- 
 
5． Results of the analyses 
5.1  Results of the regression analysis 
The results of a multiple regression analysis (OLS) concerning Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are 
shown in Table 2 below. 
From the table we can see that “percentage of public funds” has a significant negative effect both on 
“communications  with  other internal  divisions”  and “internal participation pertaining to commercial 
feasibility.” “Number of members responsible for commercialization” has a significant positive effect both 
on communications with other internal divisions and internal participation pertaining to commercial 
feasibility, as expected.    Even after controlling for this effect the negative effects produced by high 
dependence on public funds remain significant. From these results we can say that both Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 were supported. 
 





The results of a multiple regression analysis (OLS) concerning Hypothesis 3 (3-1, 3-2) and Hypothesis 
4 (4-1, 4-2) are shown in Table 3. From the table we can see that “communications with other internal 
divisions” has significant positive effects on all three performance-indicators, “technological performance,” 
“resolution of cost problems,” and “acquisition  of legitimacy.”  Hypothesis  3-1  was thus supported. 
Beyond our expectation, communications with other internal divisions is effective not only for technical 
problem solving but also for resolving cost problems.   
On the other hand, “internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility” has a significant effect 
only on “acquisition of legitimacy.”    Even including this variable separately from “communications with 
other internal divisions,” it affects “technological performance” and “acquisition of legitimacy”: contrary 
to the hypothesis there is no significant effect on “resolutions of cost problems” though a sign for the 
coefficient is as expected.    Thus we can say that Hypothesis 4-1 and Hypothesis 4-2 were only partially 
supported.   
Continuing on, Table 4 shows the results of a binomial logistic regression analysis concerning the 
effect on “commercialization.” “The business strategy within the organization changed and the project 
diverged  from  the  technology  development  orientation”  has  a  significant  negative  effect  on 
commercialization  as  expected.  Contrary  to  assumption,  however,  “unexpected  deterioration  of  the 
economy” has a positive and significant relationship to commercialization. While interpretation of this 
result is difficult, it perhaps indicates that a project that has reached commercialization is more sensitive to 
economic trends. 
Next, “technological development that is essential for the long-term strategy” has a significant positive 
effect on commercialization. We can appreciate that high expectations and commitments by management 




The results, on the other hand, show that, for a technology that “had broadly attracted attention in 
society  and  was  being  developed  by  many  firms,”  which  highlights  the  market  opportunity  and 
competitive  environment,  the  projects  tend  to  be  terminated  without  commercialization.  There  is  a 
possibility that, when a technology had already attracted intense interest with substantial competition, 
firms judged it unable to appropriate the profits even if they commercialized the results. 
With  regard  to  the  relationship  between  the  three  project  performance  variables  and 
“commercialization,”  all  of  the  performance  variables  had  a  significant  positive  relationship  with 
“commercialization” when being introduced into the model separately. In this respect, we can say that 
Hypothesis 5 is supported. However, since “technological results,” “resolution of cost problems” and 
“acquisition of legitimacy” are highly correlated, they might be endogenous. In fact, when all three 
performance variables are introduced into the model simultaneously, the only “technological performance” 
and “acquisition of legitimacy” positively affect “commercialization.”    It remains unclear whether this is 
a statistical bias caused by the high correlation itself or an actual interrelationship. We will take up this 
point again in the path analysis explored in the following section. 
 
--Table3: Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4- 
 
--Table 4: Logistic regression analysis results: Hypothesis 5-- 
 
 
5.2  Examining causal paths: Structural equation model 




discussed above are endogenous. To test the entire causal paths while taking this point into consideration, 
we next ran a structural equation models. For the analysis we used the AMOS from SPSS Inc. To keep the 
model from becoming complex, the control variables introduced into the regression analysis were not 
incorporated.    The analysis results are shown in Fig. 2. 
The results of the analysis are consistent with the results of the regression analysis in the preceding 
section. As the entire model, communications with internal divisions were obstructed when dependence 
on public funds increases, and the technological performance diminished and commercialization hindered 
as a result.  This suggests the possibility that receiving government funding itself becomes a factor 
hindering commercialization. 
Moreover, the dependency on public funds also negatively affects “internal participation pertaining to 
commercial feasibility.” What the diagrams show is that “internal participation related to feasibility” 
contributes to the “technological performance,” regardless of the dependency on public funds.    This 
implies that high dependence on public funds may lead to low technological performance, which lowers 
probability of commercialization through its negative impact on internal participation on a feasibility study. 
On the other hand, effects of “internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility” on “resolution of 
cost problems” and “acquisition of legitimacy” are not statistically significant through its signs for the 
coefficients are as hypothesized.   
As for the relationship between performance variables and commercialization, the diagram indicates 
that  there  are  direct  effects  of  “technological  performance”  and  “acquisition  of  legitimacy”  on 
commercialization, but no direct influence from “resolution of cost problems.” It also shows that both 
“technological results” and “resolution of cost problems” indirectly encourage commercialization through 




correlation, however, it seems one should exercise prudence concerning an interpretation in the direction 
of the cause and effect shown by the model. 
 
--Figure 2: Structural equation model-- 
 
6． Discussion 
6.1  Contribution and implications of the study 
With each country struggling under stringent fiscal conditions, the impact of government funding on 
private sector R&D also continues to be subjected to greater scrutiny than ever. Given such circumstances, 
significant effort has been made to strictly measure the effects government funding has on changes in 
private sector R&D, and the existing researches have understood the effect of government funding on 
encouraging (or limiting) private sector R&D mainly at an industry, national or similar macro level. The 
accumulated research a micro-level addressing the question of how the results of private sector R&D 
projects are affected by the receipt of government funding, on the other hand, remains thin. Based on this 
awareness, the present study was aimed at supplementing existing research by undertaking an analysis 
focused on the micro-level process by which government funded projects produce results. 
One important finding of this study is that, when viewed at the project level, the act of receiving 
government funding itself entails some danger of hindering the commercialization of a project’s results. 
The significance of government funding for private sector R&D lies in the fact it achieves a socially 
appropriate allocation of R&D resources, by providing support for technologies that are not profitable but 
which have social value, or by providing support for the development of technologies which, although 




corporations cannot accept because of the high degree of uncertainty. Viewed from the firm side, because 
the profitability of the R&D investment is enhanced by the receipt of public funds, government funding 
enables an enterprise to undertake, from a long-term perspective, R&D activity it had rejected in the past. 
The present study also showed that in contrast to this positive aspect of government funding, there is 
also a negative aspect from a project management standpoint. When public funds are tilted toward private 
sector R&D activity aimed at commercialization, there is a tendency for project activity to be shut off 
from the exchange of information with other internal departments. Therefore, compared with the ordinal 
R&D activity within the firm, the use of internal resources is limited, which has a negative effect on 
commercialization. We also find that high dependency on government funds tend to prevent a project to 
receive less involvement of other internal departments pertaining commercial feasibility, which also 
hinders technological performance.   
Because it is an intrinsic problem that originates from the inevitable structure of government funded 
projects, in which the side providing resources for the R&D activity and the side managing the project 
toward commercialization are separate, eliminating this problem at its source might be impossible. By 
recognizing the existence of this problem, however, the supporting side and a firm may be able to adopt 
various mechanisms to mitigate the problem. From the supporting side it is possible to make an informal 
appeal, together with an institutional guarantee, so a government funded project receives support from 
other internal departments. This might include easing restrictions on the sharing of facilities being used by 
the supported project with other internal divisions. If it earnestly obtains results from a project that 
receives government funding, and works to tie its results to commercialization, a firm should also be able 
to appeal formally or informally in a manner that encourages support from in-house. 




promotes the project results and commercialization. If this result is accepted at face value, it means it is 
important for the supporting side and the firm to encourage other internal divisions to get involved in the 
commercial feasibility. The danger that excessive involvement concerning commercial feasibility might 
destroy the autonomy of a project must also be considered, however. The problem of balance with respect 
to this point will be the focus of future research. 
Furthermore, although not a central theme of the present study, it became clear from the analysis in 
Table 4 that the strategic intent of the firm, or the societal expectations for the development technology 
and competitive conditions, are critical as factors influencing the success of commercialization. For 
example, the analysis in the present study showed there is a high probability of commercialization of 
technological developments that were judged to be essential for the long-term strategy of a firm, and that 
commercialization is dropped as the result of changes in the orientation of corporate strategy. It also 
showed that, to the extent society is already broadly aware of a technological development and there is 
tremendous competition from the very start, results will not be commercialized. 
In other words, the success or failure of commercialization appears to be greatly related not only to the 
process of technological development through the project but also to the position of the project in-house 
and its competitive position in the market. If such positions are thought to be determined to a certain 
extent at the start of the project, we can also say that the support project selection will affect the success or 
failure of commercialization. In other words, the present study suggests that the two considerations 
necessary for leading the commercialization of government funded projects to success are (1) selecting 






6.2  Limitation and direction for the future study 
We believe that by putting the focus on government funded projects and clarifying the mechanism 
connected with the results at the project level, this study has made a certain contribution to understanding. 
Nevertheless, there are also limitations as discussed below. 
First, if we are to discuss the influence of government funding, a comparison between projects that 
receive government funding from the start and projects that develop the same kind of technology without 
receiving any government funding is needed. And in fact, among the existing researches that measure the 
effect of government funding there does exist some research that prudently performed such matching at 
the firm level [10], [12], [13], [15]. For the present study focusing on individual projects as the unit of 
analysis, however, it was extremely difficult to obtain such a match sample. Therefore although the 
samples  were  limited  to  NEDO  projects,  we  decided  to  comprehend  the  effect  of  dependency  on 
government funding by classifying the samples according to dependency on public funds. Using this 
research  methodology,  however,  meant  we  could  not  understand  the  effect  from  “receiving  or  not 
receiving” government funding. If obtaining a large number of matching samples at the project level is 
difficult, then we believe that, at a minimum, it will be necessary in the future to supplement the 
knowledge  obtained  from  the  present  study  by  focusing  on  specific  projects  and  performing  a 
comparative case study with similar private sector R&D projects that have not received government 
funding. 
Finally, although the present study regarded success in the commercialization of the supported project 
as the final result, given the nature of government funding, the broad spillover effects to society as a whole, 
including  other  companies,  should  also  be  considered  as  an  important  result.  Therefore  one  future 
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N  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
1. Commercialization ~  0.34  0.48  242                             
2. Basic research ~  0.38  0.49  242  -.088                           
3. Number of members responsible for 
commercialization 
2.93  3.73  174  .011  -.175
*                         
4. Number of members participating in 
project 
6.61  6.92  242  .145
*  -.152
*  .390
**                       
5. Collaborative project ~  0.49  0.50  242  -.113  -.057  -.002  -.088                     
6. Dependence on public funds ~  0.55  0.50  230  -.151
*  -.038  .046  .002  .030                   
7. Communications with other internal 
departments 
3.33  1.04  242  .198
**  -.088  .195
*  .199
**  .000  -.143
*                 
8. Internal participation pertaining to 
(commercial) feasibility 
2.77  1.06  242  .197
**  -.075  .214
**  .172
**  .012  -.117  .334
**               
9. Unexpected deterioration of the 
economy ~ 
0.10  0.30  225  .073  -.183
**  -.051  -.035  .078  -.025  -.043  -.032             
10. Change of business strategy ~  0.11  0.31  225  -.130  .032  -.002  -.014  .160
*  .122  -.131
*  -.105  .161
*           
11. Indispensable for long-term 
strategy ~ 
0.13  0.33  242  .322
**  -.176
**  .135  .174
**  -.052  -.105  .140
*  .179
**  .062  -.084         
12. Extent of external awareness and 
competition ~ 
0.14  0.35  242  -.092  .047  .143  .055  .058  .026  -.072  .044  -.046  .111  .059       
13. Technological performance  3.60  0.73  242  .387
**  .035  .151
*  .159
*  -.056  -.006  .236
**  .173
**  .098  -.181
**  .144
*  -.005     
14. Resolution of cost problems  2.89  0.71  242  .310
**  -.019  .102  .168
**  -.045  -.045  .196
**  .128
*  .082  -.195
**  .147
*  .114  .479
**   
15. Acquisition of legitimacy  3.47  0.78  241  .364
**  -.055  .124  .159
*  -.109  .080  .264
**  .214
**  .033  -.262
**  .153





**p<0.01．  Dummy variables indicated with a tilde (~). 
 




Table 2  Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
Communication with other 
internal departments 
Internal participation pertaining 
to (commercial) feasibility 
1  2  3  4 





















































































2  .059   .094   .054   .071  
Adjusted R
2  .041   .071   .036   .048  

















Acquisition of   
legitimacy 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
























































































































































2  .025   .075   .029   .057   .033   .116  
Adjusted R
2  .012   .054   .016   .036   .020   .096  
























Divergence because of 














































































***p<0.01．Upper row is the coefficient; lower row (   ) is the Wald value. 
 












2/df  GFI  AGFI  CFI  RMSEA 
94.443




Figure 2   A result of structural equation modeling 
 